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Abstract
This article examines the behavior of Greek political parties before, as well as dur-
ing, the recent austerity period. Drawing on coalition oversight and blame avoidance
literature, it argues that the unpopularity of austerity governments leads to extreme
levels of dissent within the coalition. I operationalize this ‘intra-coalition opposition’
behavior using parliamentary questions, a legislative institution that has not been stud-
ied in the context of coalition politics. The analysis demonstrates that junior members
in unpopular austerity governments increase their use of parliamentary questions to a
degree that matches or even exceeds the formal opposition. However, intra-coalition
dissent is conditional on the type of unpopular government policies, and on the ide-
ology of coalition members. Specifically, using a new method of text-analysis, I show
that while the socialist PASOK uses its parliamentary questions to avoid or minimize
the blame associated with austerity policies, the conservative New Democracy does
not, because left leaning parties are electorally vulnerable to austerity measures. The
results have implications for studying dissent in coalition politics in general, and the
politics of austerity in particular.
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“For government, there is no equivalent to the legal right of silence.” (Norton
1993, 332)
Introduction
The Greek political system has gone through turmoil since 2009. As the scope of the economic
crisis and the severity of the subsequent austerity measures unfolded, the party system began
to go through massive changes. The Socialist Party, one of the two major players in Greek
politics, was nearly decimated in the 2012 election, and Syriza, an anti-austerity party,
challenged the political establishment. Shaky government coalitions became a necessity as
ruling parties struggled to implement painful economic policies. However, these events are
not part of an isolated ‘Greek tragedy.’ For example, in 2011 a coalition government was
formed in Portugal. This coalition of Social Democrats and Conservatives enacted severe,
unpopular austerity measures, which led to a rift between the coalition partners. The crisis
culminated with the resignation of the leader of a junior coalition member. The background
to the resignation was the opposition of factions within the party to austerity, and evidence of
the erosion of public support for these policies. In Ireland, another austerity-laden country,
the center-right Fine Gael and the left-leaning Labour formed a coalition in March 2011.
Over the following two years, characterized by aggressive austerity policies, seven key figures
in the Labour party resigned due to their disagreement with the government’s economic
policies. In 2014, amid growing concerns over the party’s numbers at the polls and Labour’s
poor electoral performance, the leader of the party resigned.
As these cases illustrate, the implementation of severe, unpopular austerity policies has
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had a profound impact on party politics. This article focuses on the Greek case. During
the period of austerity, members of Greek governments attempted to thread the needle of
holding on to power while bracing for the electoral consequences of their participation in
government. In light of these events, the article asks two general questions. First, how does
the politics of severe austerity affect the behavior of legislative parties? Second, what can
be learned from these dynamics about legislative politics in general? In order to answer
these questions, the paper draws on blame avoidance (Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 1996; Giger
and Nelson, 2011; Schumacher, Vis and van Kersbergen, 2013), and coalition oversight liter-
ature (Carrol and Cox, 2012; Indridason and Kristinsson, 2013; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011;
Martin and Vanberg, 2004; Thies, 2001). Governments and legislative environments provide
members of coalition governments with an array of mechanisms with which they can mon-
itor their coalition partners, overcome tensions within the coalition (Martin and Vanberg,
2005), or communicate intra-coalition disagreements to voters (Martin and Vanberg, 2008).
Communicating intra-coalition tensions may be especially important in unpopular austerity
governments, as parties try to minimize the political blame associated with the painful poli-
cies the government is pushing forward. Thus, the fundamental questions of this article are:
Do parties who are members of these governments increase their use of these mechanisms?
And, if so, what motivates the use of these institutions?
Focusing on parliamentary questions (PQs), an institution that thus far received little
attention in the context of coalition politics, the analysis provides a positive answer to the
first question. Junior parties in coalitions overseeing unpopular austerity measures increase
their use of these measures, to an unparalleled degree. With regard to the second ques-
tion, the results echo recent literature arguing that political ideology and electoral bases
condition blame avoidance behavior (Giger and Nelson, 2011; Jensen and Mortensen, 2014).
Specifically, the results indicate that while serving in government as junior members, PA-
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SOK - the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, uses its parliamentary questions to minimize
or avoid the blame associated with austerity, while the conservative New Democracy (ND)
does not. Thus, the article sheds light on new venues of oppositional behavior within gov-
ernment coalitions, but also highlights the importance of left-right ideology in conditioning
this behavior.
The analysis is based on a new dataset comprised of all the oral parliamentary questions
and interpellations in the Greek parliament during the 2007-2012 period. The data cover a
period that can be characterized as ‘business as usual’ (pre 2010), as well as the austerity
measures’ period. These measures were implemented by both right and left leaning parties, as
well as government coalitions.1 The focus in the first part of the analysis is on the frequency
of using PQs by legislative parties, conditional on their status as opposition/government
members. The results of this section demonstrate that while serving as junior coalition
partners in austerity governments, parties’ usage of PQs rivals their usage of this institution
while in opposition. Put differently, while parties serve as junior members in unpopular
austerity coalitions,2 they behave ‘as if’ they were in the opposition.
The second part of the analysis utilizes a new method of quantitative text analysis in
order to explore the topics of parliamentary questions. This method offers an answer as to
the reason behind the rise in PQs usage for junior members of austerity coalitions. The
analysis of topics’ distribution across PQs and parties demonstrates that while serving as a
junior coalition member, the socialist PASOK chooses to highlight problematic aspects of
austerity policies in order to avoid blame, while the conservative ND party (while serving
1 Specifically, approximately two years after leading the socialist PASOK to victory in the 2009 election
and forming a one-party government, PM Papandreou resigned in the wake of the economic crisis, and a
grand coalition between the Socialists and the Conservatives was formed (led by a non-partisan PM). After
the election in June 2012, the Conservatives formed a grand-coalition government with the Socialists.
2 I use the expressions ‘austerity coalitions’ or ‘austerity governments’ interchangeably, to denote coalition
governments whose policy agenda includes significant cuts. In the Greek case, all governments after the 2010
memorandum fall under this category.
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as a junior member of a different austerity coalition), does not. This finding is in line
with recent research by Giger and Nelson (2011) and Jensen and Mortensen (2014), which
argues that left-wing parties are more sensitive to the possible electoral cost of implementing
entrenchment policies.3
This article makes a number of contributions. First, it adds a new facet to the coalition-
monitoring literature by analyzing the use coalition members make of parliamentary ques-
tions, an institution that has not been studied systematically in the context of coalition
politics. Second, it highlights oppositional behavior of coalition members in austerity gov-
ernments. Austerity governments exemplify the dilemma faced by every coalition party. On
the one hand, parties would prefer the coalition to survive, but electoral considerations also
dictate a degree of differentiation and distancing among the parties, especially in unpopular
coalitions. In unpopular austerity coalitions this need for differentiation is extreme and is
manifested by oppositional behavior. This ‘intra-coalition opposition’ behavior is an un-
derstudied aspect of coalition politics, which should be further explored in future research.
Third, the analysis demonstrates the importance of context (specifically, government policies
and parties’ ideology) in explaining the levels and type of coalition dissent. Finally, along
with recent research focusing on legislative speeches (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014), the article
seeks to add to our understanding of the important changes undergoing the Greek party
system as a result of the economic crisis, by systematically analyzing legislative rhetoric.
3 Recent empirical work on the ideological placement of Greek parties finds that PASOK is to the left
of ND on economic issues. See (Baker, de Vries, Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Marks, Polk, Rovny, Steenbergen
and Vachudova, 2012; Gemenis and Triga, 2012, 2013).
5
Coalition Oversight and Parliamentary Questions
Coalition governments create a complex set of principal-agent problems. Given the division
of labor in modern governments, it is essential that parties allow other actors in the coalition
to take the lead on some policy issues, and play a secondary role with regard to these issues.
In their seminal work, Laver and Shepsle (1996) offer a theoretical model by which ministers
are allowed unlimited latitude with regards to their respective portfolios. However, empirical
work has shown that parties use a variety of institutions to monitor and oversee the actions
of ministers. These institutions exist both at the level of government, and in the legislative
arena. With regard to the former, Mu¨ller (2000), Thies (2001), and Lipsmeyer and Pierce
(2011) have found that parties use junior ministers to monitor the actions of ministers from
partner parties during the tenure of government, while Indridason and Kristinsson (2013)
show that coalition agreements provide an important mechanism to contain policy drift.
Shifting our focus to the parliamentary arena, legislative committees play a key role in
coalition oversight, as chairmen of strong committees have been shown to ‘shadow’ ministers
from rival (coalition partners) parties (Loewenberg and Kim, 2005; Carrol and Cox, 2012).
In addition, legislative review procedures (Martin and Vanberg, 2004, 2005), have been
identified as oversight mechanisms. These works advanced the coalition oversight literature
because they emphasized the ability of coalition parties to use legislative institutions in order
to either delay the passage of an undesirable bill or amend it at the legislative stage. More
generally, they have shown that the dynamics of coalition oversight does not end at the level
of government, but extends to the legislature.
The rationale of legislative and government-level oversight institutions is functional.
Specifically, they provide problem-solving mechanisms that allow for greater cooperation
among coalition parties. Analyzing legislative debates, Martin and Vanberg (2008) assign
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a larger role to electoral motivations. Specifically, the authors find that coalition parties
use legislative debates to communicate their positions to voters, especially on issues where
they disagree with their coalition partners. Here, the rationale is party differentiation within
the context of coalition government. This is a fundamental tension in coalitional politics,
or, as the authors put it: “one of the most delicate problems of participating in coalition:
reconciling the tension between the need to compromise on policy with the need to maintain
the party’s public profile with respect to certain policy commitments”(Martin and Vanberg,
2008, 502:503).
While scholars have identified a number of coalition-monitoring mechanisms, parliamen-
tary questions have not been systematically studied in this context.4 This lack of attention
to PQs is surprising, since in terms of their institutional intent, PQs are a legislative tool
used to monitor, gain information from, and to a lesser extent, control the actions of the
government (Wiberg, 1994; Cole, 1999; Akirav, 2011). Among others, Wiberg (1995, 185)
discusses PQs as being used for a number of goals:
1. Gain access to information
2. Gain personal publicity (for the asking member of parliament (MP))
3. Demand explanations
4. Pressure for action
5. Attack ministers
6. Show concern for constituencies
7. Demonstrate the government’s faults
4 For exceptions focusing on Austria, see Gerlich (1973); Mu¨ller et al. (2001).
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8. Rally the troops within an opposition
As can be seen, questions vary in terms of their specific goals, procedures, and style,
but the overarching purpose of PQs is that of signaling. For the political actor asking
the question, these questions offer a unique opportunity of highlighting their preferences,
and conveying them to other political actors, including parties and voters. Indeed, recent
empirical research of PQs has moved beyond description and classification. Instead, it focuses
on the strategic use of PQs by opposition parties. For example, Thesen (2013) finds that
opposition parties are more likely to raise questions on issues they own when the news is bad
(for the government). Similarly, focusing on the Danish parliament, Green-Pedersen (2010)
demonstrates that opposition parties raise questions based on issue ownership.
However, there is nothing about PQs suggesting that only members of the opposition
should use them. PQs serve two purposes in the case of coalition members. Theoretically,
the use of these questions follows the same logic outlined by scholars studying coalition
oversight processes, especially when it comes to communicating intra-coalition differences.
Most importantly, PQs offer these parties a venue for signaling to future voters how their
preferences differ from those of other coalition members. For example, criticizing the actions
of the government can serve as a mechanism of distancing coalition members from these
actions. Electorally, this can be an important tool, especially when the policies advocated
by the government are unpopular. Second, PQs can be used for monitoring purposes, that
is, they can be used to demand explanations and additional information can be useful for
coalition members. This is because the coalition member asking these questions can be seen
as protecting constituents’ interests and exposing problematic aspects in the government’s
policies.
Importantly, the logic underlying the use of PQs by coalition members is based on the
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assumption that governments are not cohesive actors, and that the preferences of coalition
partners may differ. While the main party in government, which is generally conceived as
having the last word in terms of policy making (Duch and Stevenson, 2008), may want
to keep problematic issues outside of the parliamentary agenda, the motivations of junior
coalition members may be different. These parties can provide the support necessary for
the survival of government and enjoy the perks of office, while at the same time use their
PQs for electoral and monitoring goals. Put differently, although all parliamentarians can
potentially use PQs for these purposes, it is less likely that legislators from the main party in
government will use this resource, since it might discredit their party and harm its electoral
prospects.5
Overall, PQs offer a valuable resource to junior coalition partners. They allow parties
who are junior coalition partners to stay in the coalition and enjoy the perks of government,
while behaving in a way that can be electorally beneficial. Put differently, these questions
offer a means of ‘intra-coalition opposition,’ that is, a way in which members of the coalition
can behave as if they are in the opposition. This opportunity is especially important in
unpopular governments, since by using PQs, a junior coalition member can highlight its
disagreement with the policies pursued by the coalition leader to voters.
Intra-Coalition Opposition and Blame Avoidance
Blame avoidance tactics also stem from electoral considerations. A government aiming to
cut social programs faces risks because voters are attached to the services of the welfare
5 In addition, parliamentary questions can be a valuable tool for junior members of the coalition, since
their small size prevents them from using other mechanisms such as shadowing ministers from other parties
with deputy ministers(Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011, 1161).
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state (Pierson, 1996; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 2001). If indeed these measures
are unpopular, parties in austerity coalitions might be expected to use the resources pro-
vided by their institutional environment to minimize the electoral costs associated with their
membership in government.
The first blame avoidance strategy is simply the formation of a coalition. Coalition gov-
ernments make it harder for voters to assign responsibility for policies, and thus might reduce
the electoral punishment associated with unpopular policies (Anderson, 2000; De Vries, Ed-
wards and Tillman, 2011). According to typologies of blame avoidance mechanisms, coalition
formation in the context of austerity is part of a ‘circle the wagons’ (Weaver, 1986, 388) tactic,
whereby the responsibility for policies is distributed among a number of political agents.
The second legislative blame avoidance strategy is finding a ‘scapegoat’ (Hood, 2002). In
this strategy, politicians attempt to delegate the blame for unpopular measures to others, or
at least minimize the loss they might incur for being associated with these policies. Again, in
the realm of legislative politics, junior members of the coalition are able to use this strategy.
This is because members of the main party in the austerity government cannot credibly
argue that painful austerity measures are not their party’s responsibility. It is more likely
that junior members of the coalition would at least try to minimize the blame by shifting
the responsibility for painful measures to other members of the coalition.
One important question remains. Are austerity measures always an electoral liability?
This is important because if austerity measures are popular, then there is no incentive for
members of a coalition to behave in an oppositional manner. Indeed, recent empirical work
has questioned the assumption that cutting social policies always leads to voter wrath (Giger
and Nelson, 2011; Jensen and Mortensen, 2014), by highlighting the mediating effects of fac-
tors such as the partisan composition of the government and its institutional fragmentation.
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Partisan composition might play a role because, as opposed to voters of left leaning par-
ties, voters of economically conservative parties are less sensitive to retrenchment policies
and might even favor them (Kitschelt, 2001). Institutional fragmentation affects the ability
of the public to identify and assign responsibility to relevant policy makers. In addition,
globalization and international economic structures may affect the ability of the public to
attribute responsibility to national level politicians (Duch and Stevenson, 2008).
Thus, it is necessary to examine two crucial aspects with regards to the Greek case.
First, were austerity measures unpopular in Greece? Public opinion data provided by Kos-
midis (2013, 14), demonstrate that the socialists lost more support during the 2009-2012
period than the conservatives did. While it is obvious that at least part of this precipitous
decline has to do with austerity measures, the fact that the data only cover periods where
PASOK was the major party in government (and was thus responsible for austerity), does
not allow us to make any inferences regarding New Democracy’s voters, and the impact of
austerity measures initiated by ND on their voting intentions. However, the data indicate
that austerity governments were indeed unpopular. Second, it is important to inspect the
degree to which the Greek public was able to identify the relevant political actors, and their
relationship to austerity. Greece ranks low in terms of institutional fragmentation, and thus
the ability of the public to attribute responsibility to government policies is high. What
complicates responsibility attribution is the strict conditions specified by the international
Troika in their agreements with Greek governments, essentially tying national-level politi-
cians’ hands.6 However, examination of survey data focusing on attribution of political
6 Specifically, in May 2010 the socialist Greek government agreed to the Memorandum of Economic and
Financial Policies, stipulating that in order to receive an amount of e80 billion over three years, Greek
governments will tighten their budgets aiming to reduce the deficit below 3% of GDP in 2014, achieve a
downward trajectory in the public debt-GDP ratio in 2013, stabilize the financial system, and implement
structural reforms. In February 2012 the Greek government (a technocratic government supported by a
grand coalition of right and left wing parties, led by former banker Lucas Papademos) signed the Second
Economic Adjustment Programme, emphasizing implementation of fiscal consolidation and growth-enhancing
structural reforms agreed under the programme and conditioning the continuation of financial assistance on
11
responsibility reveals that after the parliamentary approval of the bailout plan singed with
the Troika, respondents attribute more and more responsibility to their national government
at the expense of the European Union (Kosmidis, 2013, 12). Put differently, Greek voters see
their national government as responsible for the political situation, even though the latitude
given to the government by the EU is limited.
The preceding discussion leads to two testable hypotheses. First, since austerity measures
and the governments implementing them are generally unpopular in Greece, and the public’s
ability to assign responsibility for the measures is high, we might expect all junior members
of these coalitions to increase their use of PQs. As mentioned, using these measures signals
intra-coalition disagreement to other political actors, especially voters, and allows the parties
to enjoy the perks of government while behaving in an oppositional way.7
Hypothesis 1: Parties serving as junior coalition partners in unpopular austerity govern-
ments increase their usage of parliamentary questions relative to periods when they lead the
government.
Similarly, we might expect blame avoidance tactics stemming from electoral motivations
to affect the behavior of all parties who are junior members of austerity coalitions. If all
parties in government expect austerity measures to affect them in a similar fashion at the
polls, then we should observe an increase in the use of austerity related PQs by all junior
members of governments, regardless of their ideological position. However, given the differ-
ences in parties’ ideology and support bases, it is possible that conservative parties would
the implementation of austerity policies.
7 In procedural terms, PQs in the Greek parliament are well-suited for studying parties’ strategies since a
minister cannot refuse to answer a question, nor can he choose the form of the question, nor the time of the
answer. In addition, follow-up questions are permitted (both by the asking MP and other MPs) (Wiberg,
1995, 202). These procedures imply that Greek MPs are free (relative to MPs in other parliaments) in their
use of PQs.
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be less concerned about losing votes due to their membership in austerity governments. If
this is the case, we should expect only left-leaning parties to use PQs in order to avoid
austerity-related blame.
Hypothesis 2: Partisan blame avoidance: socialist Parties (PASOK) serving as junior coali-
tion partners during unpopular austerity governments will emphasize economic and social
issues in their parliamentary questions, while conservative parties (New Democracy) will not.
Data and Methodology
The raw data, consisting of 1,014 daily parliamentary sessions from July 2007 to December
2012, were retrieved from the records of the Greek parliament. The Greek parliament stores
its daily discussions (in Greek) using a variety of formats (various types of .PDF and .doc
files). Computer scripts were used in order to unify the format of the raw data into .txt.
format. In the next stage of pre-processing, I used python scripts to scrape all the oral
parliamentary questions and interpellations from daily discussions. More specifically, each
question in the dataset generally starts with an MP asking the question and the minister
providing a preliminary answer, followed by a discussion among a number of MPs. The
question ends when the chair of the session moves to a different topic on the agenda. This
yielded 2,815 oral PQs, tagged by the partisan affiliation of the MP asking the question.
The final stage of data pre-processing consisted of generating a vocabulary of the 10,000
most frequent words in the corpus, and using the vocabulary to generate the 2, 815× 10, 000
document-term matrix, which included 8,231,981 words.
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A New Method for Text Analysis: The Factor Analytic Topicky
Model
In order to analyze the content of PQs, I first select the words to be analyzed. This stage
is necessary, since the entire vocabulary used by legislators is too large to analyze, and thus
the analysis should focus on words whose covariation convey meaningful topical information.
The Factor Analytic Topicky model (FAT) model (Monroe, Rice and Tzelgov, 2013) feature-
selection approach is similar to the generic approaches used in computational linguistics
that involve removal of stop words and ranking of words based on criteria such as term
frequency-inverse document frequency, or mutual information (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003;
Grimmer, 2010). Note, however, that the FAT approach is more general, since it does not
involve arbitrary selection of words. Based on Quinn, Monroe, Colaresi, Crespin and Ragev
(2010), the first stage in this process is to calculate the per word unexpected variance as
follows. Represent the length of documents (i.e. the sum of words in each PQ) with the
Q × 1 vector l, with typical element lq. Second, denote the number of times a word w was
used in question q as yw,q. Then, for each w in (w = 1, ...,W ), calculate the variance of the
differences between the number of times it was used in the PQ and the number of times it
would have been used in a ‘typical’ PQ of the same length.8
σ˜w = var
(
yw,q −
∑
Q
q=1yw,q × lq
)
(1)
The resulting σ˜w vector captures the extent to which words in specific documents are used
differently than in the entire corpus. Words with high values of σ˜w are those that exhibit
high variation across PQs (for example, words that are used frequently in a small number
8 A ‘typical’ PQ is obtained by multiplying the frequency of every word in the entire corpus by the vector
l, resulting in speeches of the same length as PQ q, but with a word frequency identical to the corpus’
word-frequency.
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of documents, but rarely appear in others). Thus, words with high values of σ˜w are more
informative in terms of their topical content. I then rank the words based on their σ˜w values,
and choose an adequate number of words to use in the model.9 In the next stage, a ‘prior’
is added to each question.10 The prior is formally defined as median(l) ×∑Qq=1yw,q. The
purpose of this procedure is twofold. First, it shrinks the variance of the words’ frequency
towards the global mean, thus favoring the null hypothesis of no differences among words.
The second, related goal, is to penalize words that appear a very low number of times in the
corpus (for example, typos made by the legislative clerk or esoteric expressions MPs use).
In the next stage, I calculate the log-odds ratio for each word w in PQ q relative to the
log-odds ratio of its use in the entire corpus of questions:
δw,q = log
( yw,q/∑Ww=1 yw,q
1− yw,q
/∑W
w=1 yw,q
)
− log
( ∑Q
q=1yw,q
/∑W
w=1
∑Q
q=1yw,q
1−∑Qq=1yw,q
/∑W
w=1
∑Q
q=1yw,q
)
(2)
In order to standardize the values of δw,q, I approximate the variance of δw,q using equation
3:
σw,q =
1
yw,q
+
1∑Q
q=1yw,q
(3)
Finally, I obtain ζkw, which is the normalized log odds ratio for every word w, in PQ q:
ζw,q =
δw,q√
σw,q
(4)
In the final stage, I use factor analysis to model the 2, 786× 1281 Z matrix, with words
9 While choosing a larger number of words seems desirable, choosing a number of words that is too high
relative to the number of questions would make model estimation very slow. I therefore choose the 1,300
words with the highest σ˜w values.
10 Not strictly a prior, since it is driven by the data.
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serving as variables, and PQs as observations.11 The FAT model produces two quantities of
interest. First, factor loadings, which are correlation coefficients between the topics and the
words. Second, as a by-product, the model produces PQ specific factor scores. These scores
are composite variables which provide information about each PQ’s placement on a specific
topic.12
In order to illustrate the topic assignment process and the model’s results, Table 1
presents the ten highest loading words, resulting from a model estimating 21 topics.13 Based
on the words that are highly correlated with the topic, topic labels (column titles) are as-
signed. Inspection of the highest loading words appearing in Table 1 suggests that the FAT
model identifies clear, informative and cohesive topics in the PQs. However, in order to guar-
antee that the PQs match the topics assigned, I thoroughly examine the scores estimated
for the PQs, and read a sample of 30 PQs whose scores for a given topic are the highest.14
[Table 1 about here]
11 I did not stem the words, but based on a through reading of hundreds of PQs, I am confident that
this does not affect the validity of the results. I note that 14 documents are lost in the final process of data
preparation. First, moving from a vocabulary of 10,000 words to a 1,300 words leaves empty documents. In
addition, I lose 19 words because their correlation with other words in the vocabulary is greater than 0.9.
12 In terms of topic modeling, PQs offer a unique opportunity to identify ‘topics’ (based on the distribution
of words), since the questions are relatively short and well-structured. In addition, examination of PQs FAT
scores reveals they tend to be about one clear issue. Specifically, 75% of the questions have a normalized
score greater than 1.64, indicating a clear topic assignment, and only four percent are significantly about
more than one topic. Put differently, only four percent of questions have significant scores for more than one
topic.
13 Models estimating more topics yield substantively similar results. Out of the 21 estimated topics, three
are omitted because they do not provide relevant political information, but rather capture document length
or parsing errors. The final one is a residual category.
14 I also estimated a latent Dirichlet allocation model, which yields similar results. Additional tests and
examples of PQs are described in Appendix 1.
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Analysis
Figure 1 presents the monthly behavior of ND and PASOK. Regarding ND, the figure reveals
a clear opposition-government contrast in terms of PQs’ use. During its time in power (2007-
2009), ND’s MPs generally refrained from asking questions. This stands in stark contrast
to their behavior during PASOK’s time in office (2009-2011), in which they tended to ask
approximately 0.15-0.2 monthly questions per MP, significantly more than the party’s overall
average of 0.09. Interestingly, ND continues to exhibit a relatively high average number of
PQs during the unity government period (November 2011-May 2012). After forming the
second grand coalition with PASOK (June 2012), we see a slight, expected decline in ND’s
PQs’ use. Inspection of PASOK’s PQs behavior reveals that during ND’s term in power
(2007-2009) PASOK—being the largest opposition party—had generally asked more ques-
tions than during its time in office (2009-2011). However, during the grand coalition period
(June-December 2012), the figure suggests an additional increase in the average number of
questions asked by PASOK.
[Figure 1 about here]
I now turn to testing the first hypothesis. Recall that the hypothesis states that while
serving as junior partners in unpopular austerity governments, parties are expected to in-
crease their use of PQs. In order to test the hypothesis, I analyzed the behavior of these
parties (ND, who joined PASOK in November 2011 and PASOK, who joined ND in June
2012) during their partnerships in austerity coalitions (November 2011-May 2012 and June
2012-December 2012, respectively), to (1) their behavior as opposition parties, and (2) their
behavior during their tenure either in one-party governments or as the leaders of a govern-
ment (which is the baseline category in the statistical model). The dependent variable was
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the average monthly number of PQs that parties had asked during the 2007-2012 period. To
model the monthly average of parliamentary questions, a count model is used. In addition,
since the overall number of PQs for a given party is related to the number of seats the party
holds in parliament, I utilize the number of their respective MPs as an offset variable.15
Finally, since the data are overdispersed, I use a flexible quasi-Poisson model, which, as
opposed to Poisson, also estimates the dispersion parameter.16 The results are presented in
Table 2, with results for PASOK in the left column.
[Table 2 about here]
The results of the statistical model show that, as we would expect, opposition parties
use PQs much more extensively relative to periods in which they lead the government. This
finding applies to both PASOK and ND. However, the important finding is the coefficient of
the ‘junior member in coalition’ variable. This coefficient is positive and significant for both
PASOK and ND. Substantively, this means that relative to being a government leader, junior
coalition members in these governments actually behave in an ‘oppositional’ way, utilizing
parliamentary questions to a larger extent.
To provide a better overview of the magnitude of this finding, Figure 2 presents the sta-
tistical model’s predicted counts of the parliamentary questions, along with 90% confidence
intervals. The top panel presents the results for PASOK, with vertical lines capturing the
elections in October 2009 and June 2012. Examination of the results for PASOK provides
strong support for the first hypothesis. Based on the model’s results, the figure demon-
strates that not only do PASOK MPs ask significantly more parliamentary questions when
15 In practice, this means that the natural logarithm of the number of MPs is used as a predictor, but the
parameter estimate of this variable is constrained to 1.
16 This estimation strategy leads to the same coefficient estimates as the standard Poisson model, but
standard errors are adjusted for over-dispersion.
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their party is a junior coalition member than when it is leader of government, they actu-
ally ask more questions when the party is a junior coalition member than when it is in the
opposition. Specifically, when in the opposition, the monthly average number of questions
asked by a PASOK MP is 0.11, while when the party is leading the government the expected
monthly average of questions is 0.07. These estimates are significantly lower than 0.25, the
respective estimate for the period when the party is in the governing coalition as a junior
member.17
The bottom panel presents the results for ND, with vertical lines capturing the 2009 and
2012 elections, as well as November 2011, when ND joined the PASOK-led government as
a junior member. The estimates for ND show that while the PQ count is extremely low
when it is leader of the government (0.02), the monthly average of PQs asked as members
of coalition or junior members of the government are 0.16 and 0.14, respectively, which are
statistically indistinguishable. Thus, while not quite as striking in terms of their magnitude,
as a junior coalition member ND behaves ‘as if’ it is in the opposition.
Finally, the 2012 (June-December) coalition included an additional party, the moderate
left-wing Democratic Left (DL). Since the party was founded in June 2010 and first partic-
ipated in the May 2012 election, we cannot compare its performance while serving in the
coalition to other periods. However, one way to make an approximate inference about its
behavior is to subject it to a difficult test, by comparing its behavior as a junior coalition
member to that of all parties while in opposition. The monthly average for DL is 0.57 PQs,
while the mean of all parties in opposition during the 2007-2012 period is 0.31 PQs (which is
of course much higher than that of governing parties). Thus, also in the case of DL, behavior
during membership in the austerity government is characterized by increasing rates of PQs.
17 The confidence intervals for the last period of PASOK are wider than for other periods due to the
relatively small sample, with 42 PQs spread over five months.
19
Specifically, on average, it asks twice as many questions as members of the official opposition.
These results demonstrate that parties who are junior members in unpopular austerity
governments behave in an oppositional way. Parliamentary questions serve as a way for
these parties to highlight their disagreement with their coalition partners, and in austerity
governments, the data demonstrate that PQs are used by junior parties to an extent that
rivals their use by members of the opposition.18
[Figure 2 about here]
However, while it is clear that junior members increase their PQ use, regardless of their
ideology, the second hypothesis focuses on an additional important aspect: how do these
parties use their PQs? Do all parties use their PQs to minimize the blame that might be
associated with austerity policies, or does economic left-right positions affect blame avoidance
behavior?
In order to answer this question, all PQs are classified into topics by the FAT statistical
model. A PQ is considered to be about a specific topic if its score for the respective topic is
the highest among all the scores assigned to it by the model. Out of the 18 political topics
identified by the model as characterizing PQs (see table 1), I focus on two topics that capture
MPs’ views on austerity measures. The first is most naturally the welfare topic. This topic
covers the implications of the crisis and of government policies on the job market and on
economic welfare. In addition, the market topic focuses on an important aspect of austerity
measures. PQs that are classified under this topic cover economic aspects such as prices,
18 I also estimated models in which I include an indicator variables accounting for focal events in Greece
such as the first memorandum agreement in May and June 2010, which was followed by demonstrations and
clashes with the police, the clashes between protestors and police in February 2011, and the parliamentary
vote on austerity in February 2012. Including this variable does not affect the results.
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inflation and competitiveness. Overall, these topics cover the most immediate and visible
implications of the economic crisis and government austerity policies, and offer parties the
best opportunity for blame avoidance.19
To statistically test the partisan blame avoidance hypothesis, I aggregate the two topics
previously discussed into one blame avoidance topic. As suggested by Monroe, Colaresi and
Quinn (2008) and Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov and Laver (2011), in order to compare across
parties, I first calculate the odds of using blame avoidance for each party and institutional
role. Then, I compute the log of the odds ratio across the two parties, conditional on their
institutional role. The results are presented in Figure 3. The figure provides evidence that
left-right ideology affects the use of blame avoidance tactics. The difference between parties
is large and statistically significant when I compare parties’ behavior during periods when
they serve as junior members in austerity governments. Specifically, for each blame avoidance
question asked by an ND member of parliament, the average PASOK member asks 2.5. In
contrast, when I compare the behavior during periods of other institutional roles (i.e. as
opposition members or as leaders of governments), I find that there is essentially no difference
in the log odds of using blame avoidance between the parties, since the point estimates (or
the confidence intervals) cross the zero point. 20
Since various sources of data have consistently placed PASOK to the left of the Conserva-
tive ND on economic issues (Baker et al., 2012; Gemenis and Triga, 2012, 2013), the analysis
summarized in Figure 3 demonstrates how important the role of economic left-right ideology
is in influencing blame avoidance PQ behavior. Serving as junior members of unpopular
austerity governments, socialist MPs from PASOK are significantly more likely to bring up
19 See Appendix 2 for examples of PQs classified as belonging to these topics.
20 To clarify, an example of the relevant comparison here is between New Democracy’s behavior during
the November 2011-May 2012 period, when it was the junior member of a government headed by PASOK,
and the June-December 2012 period, when the roles were reversed.
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blame avoidance issues in their parliamentary questions than their conservative peers are.
However, as members of the opposition or as leaders of governments, there is no difference
between the parties.
[Figure 3 about here]
Conclusion
The article makes a number of contributions. First, by studying austerity coalitions as an
exemplar of unpopular coalitions, I argue that in general, we should observe oppositional
behavior within such governments. The results of the analyzes demonstrate that although
thus far almost unnoticed, parliamentary questions are part and parcel of the monitoring
mechanisms junior coalition parties use. In particular, I find that in unpopular austerity
coalitions, junior coalition parties use these measures to a degree that rivals opposition
parties, and at times exceeds them. This finding is important not only because it adds to
the coalition-monitoring literature by extending the coalition-monitoring ‘toolbox,’(Thies,
2001; Martin and Vanberg, 2004, 2005, 2008; Lipsmeyer and Pierce, 2011; Carrol and Cox,
2012; Indridason and Kristinsson, 2013) but also because it shows that oppositional behavior
exists within the coalition. This ‘intra-coalition opposition’ phenomenon is an important
aspect of coalition politics, and thus, further research should identify the reasons for this
oppositional behavior and the exact conditions that lead to it. Moreover, studying ‘intra-
coalition opposition’ can have implications on the way we see the government-opposition
relationship in parliamentary democracies.
Second, the analysis reveals a nuanced aspect of ‘intra-coalition opposition,’ relevant
to the politics of austerity and blame avoidance (Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 1996; Giger and
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Nelson, 2011; Schumacher, Vis and van Kersbergen, 2013). Specifically, while both right and
left leaning parties increase their use of parliamentary questions when they serve as junior
members in unpopular austerity coalitions, I find that during austerity, this effect is stronger
for left leaning parties. A new method of text-analysis is utilized to classify the questions into
topics, in order to test whether left-right economic ideology affects parliamentary questions’
use. The analysis demonstrates that the socialist PASOK uses its parliamentary questions
in order to avoid or minimize the blame that its voters associate with its membership in
the austerity coalition, while the conservative New Democracy does not. Put differently,
while both parties behave in an oppositional way because they are part of an unpopular
government, the Socialists strategically choose to use their parliamentary questions for blame
avoidance purposes. This finding provides additional support for recent studies of parties’
blame avoidance behavior (Giger and Nelson, 2011; Jensen and Mortensen, 2014) that focus
on party their electoral prospects after austerity, but not on their legislative behavior.
Overall, the case of Greece provides an impetus for further research into the delicate
balancing act faced by coalition members, especially when the coalition is unpopular, and
future elections loom large in parties’ calculations. In addition, the Greek case highlights the
degree to which that context and parties’ ideology matters a lot in studying ‘intra-coalition
opposition’. As this research has shown, austerity politics is more dangerous for left-leaning
parties and leads to a greater degree of dissent from the left, but intra-coalition dissent
depends on the type of policies pursued by the government, and in turn, on the electoral
considerations of forward-looking coalition members.
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Note: Bars represent the number of questions asked by a given party in a specific month divided by the number of legislative
seats held by the party. The party mean for the entire 2007-2012 period is represented by the superimposed grey line. Colors
represent party in power: (from left to right) the area shaded dark blue represents ND’s government. The green shaded area
represents PASOK’s government. The gray area represents the grand coalition with Lucas Papademos as Prime Minister. The
white area represents the interelection period of 2012 (May-June). The area shaded light blue represents the grand coalition
including ND, PASOK, and Democratic Left.
Figure 1: PQ behavior over Time
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Predicted Counts of Parliamentary Questions
Note: Predicted counts obtained from fitting the quasi-poisson model. Shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals. In
the top panel the left section depicts the October 2007-October 2009 period, in which PASOK was in opposition. The central
section depicts the period in which PASOK led the government, both as a leader of a one-party government, and a senior
partner of a national unity government (November 2009-May 2012). The right section depicts the period in which PASOK is
a junior coalition member. Moving from left to right, in the bottom panel the first section depicts the period in which ND
was the government party (October 2007- October 2009). Next, its period in opposition is depicted (November 2009-November
2011). The third section represents the period in which it was a junior coalition member (November 2011-May 2012). The final
section captures the period in which the party is leading a grand coalition.
Figure 2: Predicted number of questions for PASOK and New Democracy
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Note: Comparison between PASOK and New Democracy usage of the blame avoidance topic. Points represent the log odds
ratio across the two parties. Horizontal lines represent 90% confidence intervals. A vertical line is plotted at zero (i.e. no
difference across parties).
Figure 3: Log-odds of blame avoidance questions, PASOK relative to New Democracy
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Table 1: Highest loadings words, 18 substantive topics (21 topic FAT model)
farming health police schools energy welfare maritime development market
farmers health police schools energy Working Ships projects Competition
ELGA health police school energy Insurance ferry Support market
farmers hospitals police schools energy Work shipping projects income
Rural hospitals police Education renewable Employment Agency islands Program price
producers Hospital policeman children electricity unemployment Merchant Frame consumer
rural System criminality teachers energy work Island NSRF Prices
rural hospital police education sources unemployment Islanders Community market
rural Doctor police education renewable unemployed islands Investment increases
producers health crime school MW Employers ship Framework cartel
production doctors police educational energy welfare Ship work inflation
universities sports conservation prison nationalism Syriza livestock defense hospitals
universities Mediterranean forests prison Foreign Radical breeders defense hospitals
universities Mediterranean forests prisons Turkey Left Breeders defense hospital
university Games forest prisoners Greece Coalition feed defense hospitals
University BUNDLE forest prison Turkey Parliamentary livestock defensive Hospital
students Games fires Rights countries Groups breeders Defense System
students organization forest prison outdoor Tsipra livestock industry Solidarity
maximum sports fires Human country das feed Forces call
higher Sport forest Quote external SYRIZA livestock DAC drugs
institutions Sports Fire Korydallou Skopje pensions milk industry drugs
study Yeroulanos firefighters penalty Erdogan Debt milk ELVO Health
Table 2: Hypothesis 1: Quasi-Poisson model of the number of parliamentary questions by
party
PASOK ND
parameter
Junior Partner in Coalition
1.22*** 0.79***
(0.33) (0.24)
Opposition Party
0.52* 1.42***
(0.29) (0.15)
time
0.002 0.03***
(0.01) (0.005)
constant
-2.72*** -4.33***
(0.37) (0.21)
τ 3.1 1.88
Note: N=53. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1; *** p < 0.001.
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